
‘Our leaders are more preoccupied with appearing popular and
democratic without doing the reforms’
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JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Photo by Lilen Uy |
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HE BEGAN the military undertaking
that developed into the first Philippine People Power, but Juan Ponce
Enrile has vowed never again to unseat a sitting president with the
help of the military. This was what he told opponents of President
Joseph Estrada when they asked him to join Edsa Dos in 2001.
Enrile says he has long been disillusioned with what became of Edsa
1. "It has been converted into a cultist effort to mystify and
sanctify certain persons," he says.
He avoids naming former President Corazon 'Cory' Aquno and declines
to say whether or not he regrets turning over power to her in 1986. He
does say, though, that if he were to do it all over again, there would
be some "modifications." For starters, Enrile says, "I'd probably not
make people (who are unprepared) handle power."
That would have saved his men, led by Lt. Col. Gregorio Honasan,
the trouble of launching one coup attempt after another against the
Aquino government. After the December 1989 coup try, Enrile himself
was charged with rebellion complexed with murder and imprisoned
without bail. But the Supreme Court threw the case out, saying no such
charge or offense existed under Philippine laws.
Enrile was Aquino's first defense minister. He had occupied the
same position in the Marcos government. But by the time he and members
of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) holed up with several
sympathizers first in Camp Aguinaldo, and then in Camp Crame, for four
days in February 1986, he had already tendered his resignation from
the Marcos cabinet.
That was probably because he was preparing for something bigger.
According to Enrile, there was a point during Edsa 1 when he could
have assumed power. One plan had him heading a revolutionary council
upon Ferdinand Marcos's ouster. Among those being considered as
council members were Cory Aquino, widow of slain opposition leader
Benigno 'Ninoy' Aquino Jr.; Gen. Fidel Ramos, then the vice chief of
staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Ambassador to Thailand
Rafael Ileto; Rafael Salas, head of the United Nations Population
Fund; plus two military officials and three civilians.
Enrile says a despondent Marcos had surrendered the government to
him on the morning of Feb. 25, 1986. But Enrile took into
consideration the snap election held just a couple of weeks before, in
which Marcos had done battle with Cory Aquino. Marcos was proclaimed
winner by the Commission on Elections, but now here he was, fleeing.
"It would have been awkward, in my judgment, for the military to
assert itself and assume power when there was a group, a democratic
group that contested the right of Marcos to govern," says Enrile.
"With that argument, the others agreed with me when I said, 'Let's
attend the oath taking of Cory in Club Filipino.'"
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JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Photo by Lilen Uy |
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ALTHOUGH IT was over in a matter of days, the
first Edsa revolt actually took nearly four years in the making.
Enrile and some of his staff and security officers hit the drawing
boards in late 1982, even before they knew that Marcos had become very
ill. They saw cracks in the Marcos government and since there was no
constitutional provision for succession, they were worried that things
would become messy once he was gone.
In most circles, it had been assumed that Enrile, one of Marcos's
most trusted associates, was the strongman's heir apparent. But Enrile
and his supporters had learned that Gen. Fabian Ver, then the armed
forces chief, was planning to set up a post-Marcos military
government.
"We were thinking of protecting ourselves because of the growing
fissures in the Marcos government," says Enrile. At the same, he adds,
they felt that it was time to really dismantle the martial-law
machinery. Martial law had been "lifted" in 1981, but Marcos retained
his authoritarian powers. Interestingly, when Marcos declared martial
law in 1972, he had cited a supposed ambush on Enrile's car as proof
that the move was necessary.
The Enrile blueprint for a post-Marcos scenario included a
revolutionary transition government that would evolve into a
democratic one. At least that's what he says. Enrile also says there
were target dates for a mutiny, but unforeseen events caused several
postponements. One was the 1983 assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Another
came on Nov. 3, 1985, when Marcos suddenly announced on a U.S. TV news
show that he would be calling for a snap election.
"Because of that election set for February," says Enrile, " I told
my people, what's the point in this military effort against the
government when there's going to be an election? If Marcos loses,
that's the end. (We achieve) our purpose of returning the country into
a condition of democratic freedom. If Marcos (wins), then we will
rethink our position."
And so when Marcos was proclaimed winner of the Feb. 7, 1986 snap
polls, Enrile and company brought out their plan. They decided to
mount the mutiny on the dawn of Feb. 23, a Sunday. But of course they
would never get a chance to carry that out.
BY THE early morning of Feb. 22, the security
group Enrile had assigned to then Trade Minister Roberto Ongpin was
caught casing the house of Marine commander Brig. Gen. Admiral Artemio
Tadiar in Fort Bonifacio. Enrile would later get a call from Honasan,
who would say they had to make a decision: disperse or face Marcos in
Manila. Enrile's reply: "Let's face him in Manila."
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JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Photo by Lilen Uy |
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Enrile then chose Camp Aguinaldo as their base because it happened
to be his turf. He was simply unfamiliar with the terrain of the other
military camps that his men were suggesting.
"That was how Edsa People Power came to be," he says. "People went
to Edsa because it was in Camp Aguinaldo that I decided to hold myself
there to challenge Marcos."
Later, he would make that famous crossover to Camp Crame, where AFP
Vice Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos, who had also withdrawn his support
from Marcos, was. The reason for the crossover was practical: the
buildings at Crame were stronger.
Enrile says that from the start they were confident they would be
supported by the public, which they felt had more than enough of
Marcos at that point. But they didn't anticipate the size of the crowd
that eventually massed at Edsa.
Yet, Enrile says they would have succeeded even if the people had
not come. "In the evening of Monday (Feb. 24)," he says, "we were
already sure that we had the force to drive Marcos out. We had already
the Air Force."
Enrile ordered an aerial attack on Malacañang, but took care to say
the palace should not be hit directly. He says, "Marcos was so scared
when the helicopters flew over Malacañang."
Enrile's order may have been a tit-for-tat for his own scary
moment. That came in the morning of Feb. 24, when rumors flew that
Marcos had ordered an aerial attack on Camp Crame. He says, "Although
I knew that if any helicopter would take off, those helicopters would
join us, my misgiving arose because I heard that the commander was
Col. Antonio Sotelo , who was unknown to me." But Sotelo, an Ilocano,
was known to many others to be very close to Ver, Marcos's ever-loyal
general.
There was a five a.m. mass at Crame that day, and Enrile's seatmate
turned out to be activist Bishop Francisco Claver. At the end of the
mass, Philippine Military Academy alumni among those present sang
their college song. It was a very emotional moment, and Enrile was
moved to ask Bishop Claver to give him the rites of extreme unction.
He was ready for Sotelo. The colonel did come later with his
helicopters, but he and the seven other pilots with him would land at
the Camp Crame grounds and join the rebels.
Enrile admits to also being afraid at the beginning of their
revolt. "There was no question that there was some tingling in my
stomach but finally I made the resolution that this is it, either I
will make it or I die," he says. "You become calm, you become serene."
SERENITY, HOWEVER, however, isn't something people
usually associate with Enrile. This was, after all, the man who was
said to be the real mastermind of martial law. Acknowledged as a
brilliant lawyer, Enrile was also considered as sharp and as cunning
as Marcos.
Today at 82, he shows little sign of any wear and tear. During
Estrada's impeachment trial, he clearly outclassed the other senators,
and probably had the private prosecutors wishing they had him on their
side instead.
His savvy also extends to business, with interests that range from
matchsticks manufacturing to real estate. Last November he incurred
the ire of environmentalists when his timber company in Samar obtained
a permit to resume logging in a national park. His business interests
were already formidable before 1986. But since then, they have
flourished and expanded, although they had been hit by bad times in
recent years.
Enrile says he is disappointed the Philippines has missed out on
the opportunities presented by People Power. He says it all boils down
to leadership. "I realized that people are idealistic, they want to do
good," he says. "But then, when they hold power, they forget their
promise to the people."
He says people who participated in our political upheavals may want
to appear revolutionary, but do not turn out to be so. Enrile says
there has been no one "in the class of Mustafa Kamal Ataturk of
Turkey, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, Vietnam's Pham Van Dong and China's
Deng Xiaoping." He notes, "Our leaders are more preoccupied with
appearing popular and democratic without doing the reforms that are
needed first in the economy and later on in the political life of the
country."
Still, Enrile has serious doubts that protests against President
Gloria Arroyo would succeed. There is simply a lack of a military
component, he points out. Not that the military is less political now,
he adds, "but it's an institution that believes in stability and the
Constitution. You must give them a very big cause to break the chain
of command."
He also says, "Arroyo's continued stay in power despite her
unpopularity and protests led by no less than Cory Aquino disproves
the myth created after EDSA Uno that the one that made Cory Aquino
president was actually People Power."
"Without that military group," says Enrile, "Cory Aquino and her
group would be marching all over the place for the next decade and
they won't accomplish anything."
Enrile is writing his version of Edsa 1 for his grandchildren, some
of whom are already grown up. "I want them to read it when I'm gone,"
he says. In the meantime, Enrile says he and his RAM boys will be
marking the upcoming Edsa 1 anniversary the same way they have done
for the last 19 years: they will attend mass and say a prayer for the
Philippines. — Ellen Tordesillas